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FOREWORD
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies
Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This
year's theme was, "China Into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner
and . . . or Peer Competitor."
Dr. Samuel S. Kim of Columbia University argues in this
monograph that, while post-Tiananmen China is a growing regional
military power, it is, almost paradoxically, a weak state both
pretending and trying to be a strong one. By flexing its muscles
with its weaker neighbors, China, is largely compensating for
self-doubts about its national image and strength.
What the world sees in China, a modernizing, economically
robust, and assertive regional hegemon and world power "want-tobe," is, Dr. Kim asserts, at least in part a facade. Although
China has made remarkable economic progress in the past few
years, those who trumpet its rise do not consider its massive
internal contradictions involving social, political, demographic,
and environmental problems. Dr. Kim makes the point that
weaknesses in those areas cannot be overcome by purchasing modern
weapons, even those high-tech weapons that bolster a nation's
claim to being a major military power.
The United States is, and in all likelihood will remain, a
Pacific power. China, despite the limitations Dr. Kim examines
herein, will be an immense factor in the strategic balance of
power in the Pacific region. For that reason, I commend this
monograph to you.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHINA'S QUEST FOR SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
INTRODUCTION
China's security behavior, riddled with contradictions and
paradoxes, seemed made to order for challenging scholars and
policymakers concerned about the shape of things to come in postCold War international life. With the progressive removal of the
Soviet threat from China's expansive security parameters from
Southeast Asia, through South Asia and Central Asia, to Northeast
Asia, coupled with the growing engagement in international
economic and security institutions, came perhaps the most benign
external strategic environment and the greatest international
interdependence that China has ever enjoyed in its checkered
international relations. Despite the deterioration of SinoAmerican relations in the past 2 years, most Chinese strategic
analysts do not believe the United States poses a clear and
present military threat. Indeed, there has been no shortage of
upbeat assessments of China's post-Cold War security environment
to be, on balance, the least threatening since the founding of
the People's Republic in 1949.1 And yet Beijing has been acting
in recent years in a highly provocative manner as if it were
faced with the greatest threat. For good or otherwise, Beijing
managed to capture global prime time with the "rise of China"
chorus in the global marketplace suddenly turning into the "rise
of China threat" debate in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
All the same, Beijing seemed determined enough to proceed with
all deliberate speed to beef up its military power projection
capabilities, especially air and blue-water naval power, with the
real military spending increasing at double-digit rates even as
global military spending, especially those of all the other
members of the Perm Five in the United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council, began to fall sharply since 1992.2 The revealing paradox
of the capitalist world economy is that "market Leninist China,"
with the fastest growing economy--China's GDP in 1994 reached
almost $3 trillion on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis,
making it the second-largest economy in the world after the
United States3--is, at the same time, the fastest-growing emitter
of greenhouse gases and the largest recipient of multilateral aid
from the World Bank and of bilateral aid from Japan!
What matters most is not so much the growth of Chinese
capability as how Beijing uses its new military strength. Through
a series of provocative actions, China has cast a long shadow
over the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. The
demonstration of China's military muscle as an up-and-coming
naval power is all the more unsettling, as the Asia-Pacific
region is a primarily maritime theater with several major flash
points. In recent years Beijing expanded its dominion in the geostrategically vital and geo-economically contested South China
Sea, test-launched its first mobile intercontinental ballistic
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missile, and continued to defy the post-Cold War moratorium on
nuclear testing. China's southward creeping expansionism from the
Paracels to the Spratlys to Mischief Reef is a stark reminder of
Beijing's growing naval power--and its willingness to use it if
necessary--in a resource-rich area of more than 3.6 million
square kilometers. Only China, among the five recognized nuclear
powers (with the short-lived exception of France), defied the
post-Cold War moratorium on nuclear testing that has been in
place since October 1992. Then came a series of missile-firing
military exercises toward various target areas near Taiwan in
July and August 1995. The latest third round of saber-rattling
missile diplomacy started March 19, 1996, following 9 days of
live-ammunition air and naval maneuvers and ballistic missile
testings to stop Taiwan's accelerated march toward democracy only
to help people on Island China to forge a more distinct Taiwanese
identity. As well, this latest (mis)guided missile embargo caused
ripples throughout the region and beyond.
SECURITY, LEGITIMACY AND IDENTITY
What, then, accounts for the puzzle of an ascent postTiananmen China and its post-Cold War international demarche in
the seemingly benign external security environment? This is not
an easy question to answer, but one thing seems relatively
certain. With the clarity and simplicity of East-West conflict
gone and the collapse of Marxist-Leninist ideology as the
legitimizing prop, Beijing is seemingly unsure of its place in a
world no longer dominated by superpower rivalry, and the
communist regime is in the grip of an unprecedented legitimationcum-identify crisis. Not since the founding of the People's
Republic in 1949 have the questions of internal and external
legitimacy--catalyzed by the Tiananmen carnage and the collapse
of global communism--been as conflated as in the early post-Cold
War years. As a result, the Chinese leadership is compelled to
shift from charismatic and ideological legitimation to
performance-based legitimation (economic growth). As well, the
regime has turned with greater urgency to hypernationalism based
on a new amalgam of ethnonational appeals to the ancient,
glorious Confucian past and the greatness of Chinese civilization
and people. Such national identity enactment may be seen as a
necessary compensatory-searching behavior, a function of a regime
with weak legitimacy trying hard to bring about national
reunification and restore what Chinese of every ideological
coloration believe to be their natural and inalienable right to
great power status. Herein lies the logic of China
exceptionalism, seeking China-specific exemption in the
international human rights regime and China- specific entitlement
in international security and economic institutions, all in the
service of restoring China's great-power status. Nonetheless, the
decay of the legitimizing prop of socialism and the rise of Han
chauvinism can be expected to have far-reaching impacts on
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Beijing's quest for security as well as on the peace and
stability of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
CHINA'S CONCEPT OF SECURITY
The traditional Chinese concept of security is captured in
an old Chinese aphorism--"The country that has no enemy in mind
will perish." Likewise, the opening lines of volume one of
Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung read: "Who are our enemies? Who
are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for
the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary
struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite
with real friends in order to attack real enemies."4 Security in
traditional (pre-modern) China, Johnston concludes in his welldocumented study of Imperial China's strategic culture and grand
military strategy, was a "product of superior military
preparations, the application of violence, and the destruction of
the adversary."5 The historical experience of Western and
Japanese imperialism during the century of national humiliation
(1839-1945) seems to have endowed the Chinese with the 19th
century conception of absolute state sovereignty and taught the
lesson of the importance of power politics in international
relations and its corollary--that China could not be respected
without power. The same experiential logic of the Korean War
seemed to be on Mao's mind when he said in 1956: "If we are not
to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the
[atomic] bomb."6 In short, China's concept of security at a given
point in time can be seen as made manifest in the concept of
power, the definition of the external security environment
(including the identification of the enemy), and the evolution of
military doctrines.
Despite the quantitative explosion of IR literature in the
post-Mao era, a corollary of the globalization of Chinese foreign
relations in the 1980s, there is a paucity of articles and books
specifically keyed to China's own concept of security.7 One
interesting and revealing exception is a commissioned monograph
entitled "On China's Concept of Security," written in 1985 or
1986 by Ms. Song Yimin, Head for the Studies of World Politics,
Institute of International Studies, Beijing, for the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). This
monograph may be accepted as reflecting the semi-official party
line of the mid-1980s and, as such, a point of departure for
examining China's concept of security as evolved and made
manifest in numerous official and scholarly definitions of the
changing international situation and the evolution of military
doctrines.8
The post-Mao Chinese concept of security, as expounded by
Song, is broad and multidimensional, involving not only military
considerations but also political and economic factors.
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Obviously, China's security requires and demands a strong
national defense, but it also implies political stability and
unity as well as a sound and prosperous economy. More strikingly,
there is no identification of the enemy as she advances the
notion of global interdependence as China's security "is [circa
mid-1980s] inseparably linked to world peace": "In the world
today, economic interaction and interdependence are greater and
more evident than ever before . . . The world has become one. No
country can afford to seal itself from the outside."9 To sum up:
China's security = military strength + domestic political
stability + national unification + prosperous economy + world
peace. To reverse the formula, world peace depends on a strong
China: "The more China develops, the greater the restraint for
war, the greater the assurance for [world] peace."10 Here we find
China's late 19th century reformers' notion of "a rich state and
a strong army" (fu guo qiang bing)--actually borrowed from
Japan's Meiji reformers--as revised and updated to form a
comprehensive yet materialist notion of security. What is also
made loud and clear in Song's exposition of the Chinese concept
of security is a kind of "hegemonic stability theory" with
Chinese characteristics: world peace and stability depends on a
strong China. As paramount leader Deng Xiaoping succinctly put
it, "The stronger China grows, the better the chances are for
preserving world peace."11 Still, we need to accept Song's
exposition as a time-specific (pre-Tiananmen) and a situationspecific (for the U.N. audience) conception of Chinese security.
What has remained unchanged in the post-Cold War era is the
notion that a strong, stable and prosperous China is an
irreducible prerequisite to world peace. Such thinking has found
its way into various blends of Pax Sinica proposals in the course
of China's first-ever grand debate on world order in the early
1990s.12 What has changed is the Chinese concept of power, a
subtle but significant shift from a normative to a material
direction. Mao repeatedly stressed justice (normative power) as a
critical component in the equation of national and international
power. During the Maoist era, there was a recurring propensity to
make a virtue out of weakness by defining Chinese power as a sum
total of both material and normative power: "Though, for the time
being, the output of some products is smaller on our side than in
the imperialist countries, yet, since we are on the side of
socialism, the socialist system plus a certain level of material
strength gives us superiority in the entire balance of power."13
Faced with the demise of the strategic triangle, the end of
the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and
the clear and present danger of the "new world order" all coming
in rapid succession, the 14th Party Congress in late 1992
signaled an official closure to the decade-long debate about the
structural reality of the international situation. Bipolarity is
now pronounced to have ended as the international system is
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heading rapidly towards multipolarity. A multipolarizing world is
cast in a new light as giving rise to new geopolitical alignments
in the Asia-Pacific region and, concomitantly, intensified
rivalry for "comprehensive national strength" (CNS, zonghe
guoli), now the official party line on China's national
security.14 The CNS line easily translates itself into the
definition of the post-Cold War world as a dangerous neoDarwinian jungle where China's national security interests are
best protected through unilateral security. Whether a country can
succeed in global competition is said to depend upon the
development of its high-tech industries. If China is to become a
world power, it must attend to these industries, as it once did
to the development of nuclear weapons and satellite programs.15
There is no escape from this high-tech rat race if China is ever
to regain its proper place in the post-Cold War world. China has
to be competitive with more powerful military/industrial powers
if it is to beat them at their own game. Indeed, some strategic
analysts see the relatively benign post-Cold War security
environment as the unprecedented opportunity for accelerating the
military modernization drive--and thus narrowing the military gap
with Russia and the United States--without diverting too many
resources from economic development. As two military analysts put
it: "The relatively peaceful international climate and our
friendly relations with our neighbors are providing fine external
conditions for PLA weapons development."16
Despite the situation-specific changes and shifts in Chinese
definitions of the regional and global orders, then, there
remains at the core a fundamentally Realpolitik view of the
outside world as essentially conflictual where antagonistic
contradictions and rivalries are the norm. At the same time,
global debate on the new world order is said to be symptomatic of
the emerging neo-Darwinian contest for an all-out struggle for
power in which every major state actor jockeys for a favorable
position during the process of tumultuous change.
Even during the "world peace/development line" period (mid1984 to mid-1989), the Chinese leadership was ambivalent about
the concept of global interdependence even as Chinese
representatives made repeated references to the concept in global
institutions. The CCP has never directly and explicitly endorsed
the concept of global interdependence. In the post-Cold War and
post-Tiananmen era, however, the concept of global
interdependence came under assault. President Bush's espousal of
"a new world order" was attacked as the invisible integrationist
hand of the conspiratorial peaceful evolution strategy that seeks
to establish a "‘free' federation or a federation of ‘democratic
countries' on the basis of a common principle and common outlook
and values (an integration similar to the Federation of Great
Britain)." The Chinese came to view such a scheme as having a
global reach that extends to Asia, Africa, and Latin America;
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that is, the United States "aims at bringing the entire world
under its rule."17 The revised definition of the world situation,
according to a classified Communist party document, rejects the
core assumptions of the world peace/development line, warning
instead that world politics has entered a new phase of "the
struggle between the two systems." Although varying "in its form,
intensity and the tactics employed," we are told, the two-system
struggle "will be sharper, more complex and more intense than
before."18 The major challenge that China will have to face and
respond to in the next 15 years (1995-2010) is not one of
managing global interdependence but a concerted Western plot to
split and weaken China by giving support to separatists in
minority localities, by exaggerating and taking advantage of the
center/periphery contradictions, intraparty policy differences,
state/society chasm, and by exerting pressure on such issues as
"democracy" and "human rights."19
Some international relations scholars have even resurrected
the Maoist line espoused in the United Nations in the early 1970s
that interdependence in the contemporary world economic system
amounted to no more than an asymmetrical interdependence "between
a horseman and his mount." In the post-Cold War era
interdependence in a world without a world government (anarchy)
can fuel and accentuate zero-sum power politics by trampling on
the sovereignty of weak states, by preventing weak states from
controlling their economic, military and political resources, and
by providing more opportunities for some states to interfere in
the internal affairs of others.20 Consider and contrast, for
instance, Zhao Ziyang's "world peace and development line"
replete with the global interdependence theme in the mid-1980s
with Jiang Zemin's CNS line in 1992 challenging the military
"should enhance combat strength in an all-around way; should more
successfully shoulder the lofty mission of defending the
country's territorial sovereignty over the land and in the air,
as well as its rights and interests on the sea; and should
safeguard the unification and security of the motherland."21
Consider and contrast as well what Wang Jisi, Director of the
Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, had to say on this matter in 1994, compared to what
Song Yimin said in 1986:
In essence, China's leading political analysts doubt
the virtue of what is referred to in the West as
interdependence and globalization. They tend to see the
world as increasingly chaotic and assertive nationalism
and fierce economic competition as the main features
of international relations. In their eyes world
politics continues to involve a zero-sum game, and a
hierarchy of power inevitably exists within which the
more powerful nations dominate the weak.22
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Military power as the most important component of the CNS is
viewed as indispensable for China to regain its status as a
leading world power and to defend against any threats, actual or
imagined, to Chinese sovereignty and integrity. Without
sufficient military power, according to China's strategic
analysts, it will not be possible to successfully enact China's
national identity as a world power or to play a decisive role in
global politics. Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian spelled out
without any prioritization the PLA's wish list: "We must have
whatever other big powers have already had in their inventory."23
The proposition that sufficient military power buys both
deterrence and status reflects and effects internal debates about
why China needs more and better high-tech weapons systems
including nuclear weapons. "What has not changed in the post-Cold
War era," as Johnston argues, "is a deeply rooted hard
realpolitik worldview that nuclear weapons buy both soft power
(international status and influence) and hard power (military
operational power)."24 Similarly, advocates of blue-water naval
modernization speak not only of protecting oceanic shipping
lanes, fishing grounds, and resources, but also of increasing
China's "national awesomeness" (guo wei) and expanding "political
influence" (zhengzhi yingxiang).25
All the same, the post-Cold War global situation is defined
in terms of how it affects China's internal security as well as
threats near abroad. Indeed, the blurring of the domestic and
external divide is now acknowledged as one of the defining
features of international relations in the post-Cold War era.26
Of particular concern to China as a multinational state is that
local and regional ethnonational conflicts, previously
overshadowed and repressed by the global superpower contention,
are breaking out in many parts of the world. Of the 89 armed
conflicts between 1989 and 1992, all but three were, or are,
"internal conflicts" and "state-formation" conflicts. Wars of
national identity mobilization have emerged as the primacy
species of regional conflict in the post-Cold War setting.27 With
the demise of the threat of direct military invasion, according
to Yan Xuetong, a leading strategic analyst, China, too, is now
plagued by ethnic separatism and border disputes, with "hypernationalism" (jiduan minzuzhuyi) having already made extensive
inroads among China's separatists in the post-Cold War setting.28
China is "home" to about 16 million Muslims of various
ethnonational minorities in the strategically vital province of
Xinjiang (where Lop Nor nuclear test site is located) and as such
acutely sensitive to the dangers of Muslim separatism fueled by
worldwide Islamic fundamentalism. In the five-nation treaty of
April 1996, China, Russia, and three former Soviet Central Asian
republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) have reached
an understanding to join forces to combat the spread of
fundamentalist Islamic movements within their respective borders.
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The question as to what country presents the clear and
present threat to China's security--hence the enemy-- remains
unclarified in Chinese policy pronouncements. The evidence from
internal discussions is ambiguous and contradictory. According to
some secret reports from the Central Military Commission (CMC),
leaked to and published in Hong Kong, a strong military
cooperation with Russia is believed to be essential for breaking
the Western embargo on military technology. In April 1993,
Admiral Liu Huaqing, a standing committee member of the
Politburo, was reported to have mobilized 50 top military
officers to send an anti-U.S. petition in which the military
"strongly oppose bartering away [China's] principled criteria for
state-to-state relations in exchange for bilateral trade."29 In a
meeting with President Jiang Zemin on September 8, 1993,
according to a Hong Kong journal with close ties with Beijing,
eight senior generals led by Defense Minister Chi Haotian were
said to have presented President Jiang with a petition signed by
180 high-ranking officers demanding that China "take a solemn and
just stand" against the United States.30 In early September 1993,
two top-secret documents underscored the importance of building a
new type of relations with Russia as "a new strategic move to
prevent U.S. hegemonism from subverting China and intervening in
the internal affairs of other Asian countries."31 And yet, a
major PLA conference held in late 1993 to debate and determine
China's primary security threat was reported to have reached no
consensus, only varying estimates, with about 50 percent of the
participants believing the primary threat in the next century to
be Japan, 40 percent believed the United States, while only 10
percent believed it would be a resurgent Russia.32 As one
People's Daily commentator noted:
Gone are the days when a clear line between friend and
foe could be drawn and confrontation between groups
could be seen. A new picture, more complicated and
characterized by a condition in which one is neither
friend or foe or both friend and foe has emerged.
Proceeding from their own basic interests, Russia, the
United States, and other major Western powers attack,
defend, charge, and retreat in the big chess board of
international politics.33
With the sharp downturn in Sino-American relations since
mid-1995, the conspiracy school seems to have gained ascendancy
in China's assessments of the international security environment.
Many strategic analysts now argue that America's China policy is
"engagement" in word but "containment" in deed. Still, America's
"containment policy" is viewed in more political and ideological
than military and strategic terms. Jiang Zemin's 1992
authoritative assessment of China's external security
environment as "never been more satisfactory since the founding
of the Republic" still remains largely unrevised.
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The Gulf War demonstrated with particular clarity the type
of warfare with which the Chinese armed forces would be tasked,
triggering a doctrinal shift from the Dengist strategy of
fighting people's war under modern conditions to a high-tech
strategy of achieving a quick, decisive military victory in a
matter of days. This shift to fighting and winning local wars
under post-Cold War high-tech conditions was also aimed at
developing a mobile, rapid-reaction, high-tech military force
that is able to fight small "low intensity" border or near abroad
conflicts. In keeping with the shift in general military
doctrine, China has, from the late 1980s onward, moved toward a
more flexible warfighting doctrine of limited nuclear deterrence
requiring sufficient counterforce and countervalue tactical,
theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of
conventional or nuclear war.34
One of the most remarkable and potentially dangerous
developments in the post-Cold War era is the rise of "haiyang
guotu guan" (concept of sea as national territory). The Chinese
people have been prodded to cultivate and cherish haiyang guotu
guan so as to direct their attention to the unpleasant fact that
it is China's maritime interests that have been encroached upon
most alarmingly in recent history: "Territorial claims laid by
foreign countries over China's maritime territory amounts up to
one million square kilometers, ten times the size of China's
disputed land border. By now, over thirty Chinese islands with
surrounding waters are still in the hands of foreigners. Losses
in maritime interests are really to be grieved and they call for
our serious consideration."35 As well, Chinese strategists now
speak of the need for "survival space" (shengcun kongjian)--and
for strategic frontiers that extend horizontally into the Indian
Ocean, the South China and East China Seas, and vertically into
space. A recent internal Chinese document states that the
disputed island groups in the South China Sea, some of them
situated nearly 1,000 kilometers south of China's Hainan island
province and most of them subject to conflicting jurisdictional
claims, could provide lebensraum for the Chinese people.36
Consonant with such a concept of sea as national territory and
China's lebensraum in the coming years, China's naval military
doctrine has shifted from the coastal defense of the mainland to
active defense of maritime economic, resource, and strategic
interests. Based on such doctrinal ground, China's naval
exercises and gunboat operations have extended progressively
further away from coastal waters in the 1990s.
CHINA'S SECURITY BEHAVIOR
The point central to understanding China's quest for
security and identity is to recognize that, since the collapse of
the traditional Sinocentric world order in the late 19th century,
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this proud and frustrated Asian giant has had enormous difficulty
finding a comfortable niche as an equal member state in the
family of nation-states. Even during the Cold War years,
Beijing's security behavior was beyond compare. Beijing has had
difficulties in maintaining enduring friendship with any Asian
state. Beijing has established by choice or by necessity a track
record that no other country could possibly match: it had an
alliance as well as a Cold War relationship with the socialist
superpower, both of which proved to be inconclusive; it had a war
and a quasi-alliance relationship with the capitalist superpower,
both of which proved to be short-lived. Beijing's relations with
New Delhi also shifted from the accommodative friendship of the
mid-1950s to the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. In the mid1960s, Sino-Indonesian relations abruptly veered from nearalliance to extreme hostility, and in the late 1970s, SinoVietnamese relations rather unexpectedly deteriorated from
"boundless affection and assistance" to hot and then cold war.
Thus, the People's Republic succumbed to wild swings of national
identity enactment, mutating through a series of roles: selfsacrificing junior partner in the Soviet-led socialist world;
self-reliant hermit completely divorced from and fighting both
superpowers; the revolutionary vanguard of an alternative United
Nations; self-styled Third World champion of a New International
Economic Order; status quo-maintaining "partner" of NATO and
favored recipient of largess at the World Bank; and, now, lone
socialist global power in a postcommunist world. None of these
identities has much to do with Asian regional identity. The vast
gap between being and becoming in the drive for status--and the
contradiction between being a regional power and having global
aspirations--have introduced a fundamental paradox in the
prioritization of China's multiple identities.
Regional Security Behavior.
China's regional security behavior seems to be propelled by
unilateralism in bilateral clothing with little Asian
regionalism. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's Pacific
overtures in 1986-88 for a comprehensive cooperative security
system for the entire Asia-Pacific region were countermanded and
scaled back to the bilateral negotiating level in order to
pressure the Soviets to meet China's three security demands (the
so-called Three Obstacles) as the price for renormalizing SinoSoviet relations. Beijing quashed Australian, Canadian, and
Japanese proposals for a multilateral Asia-Pacific security
conference--a sort of Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Asia (CSCA). Likewise, Beijing categorically rejected any
international conference, let alone the establishment of a
multilateral regime for handling territorial disputes,
maintaining instead that disputes should be resolved by the
countries directly involved on a bilateral basis. The
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multinational conflict over the Paracel (Xisha in Chinese) and
Spratly (Nansha in Chinese) Island groups in the South China Sea
underlines the dialectics of Chinese conflict-making and
conflict-coping behavior. While Chinese diplomats often talk
about international cooperation for the pacific settlement of
disputes, Chinese strategists reject the proposition that the
seabed resources of disputed areas in the South China Sea should
be jointly developed, while shelving the issue of sovereignty.
The disputed Paracel and Spratly Island groups have become a
dangerous flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region. No less than six
states--Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and
Vietnam--have competing jurisdictional claims over the
potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam
lay claim to all the Spratly Islands, while the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Brunei claim parts of them. The Spratly and Paracel
Islands also straddle sea lanes vital to Asia-Pacific states,
adding geo-strategic and geo-economic dimensions to the simmering
conflict. China, Taiwan, and Japan are also locked in dispute
over the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) Islands farther north in
the East China Sea. To possess the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which
comprise five islands some 166 km northeast of Taiwan, is to have
legal jurisdiction over about 21,645 square kilometers of the
continental shelf which is believed to be one of the last
unexplored hydrocarbon resource areas in the world.
The conventional wisdom that Beijing would leave ASEAN
countries alone in its southward expansionism in the South China
Sea, concentrating all of its shots at the weakest link--Vietnam,
was shattered on February 8, 1995, when Filipinos woke up to find
a Chinese flag fluttering on Mischief Reef just 200 or so
kilometers from Palawan Island. Although the reef is well within
Manila's 200-mile exclusive economic zone--recognized by the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that
entered into force in 1994--the best President Fidel Ramos could
do was to come up with the "right is might" normative response as
well as to depict the Chinese "might is right" occupation as a
multilateral, not bilateral, challenge for the ASEAN to deal
with. The Chinese raid on Mischief Reef has been made all the
more shocking by China's separate claim to some of Indonesia's
gas fields. In 1994 Indonesia discovered that, according to
China's cartography, its Natuna gas field, well within its 200mile exclusive economic zone, now lies within Chinese waters.
Apparently, quiet behind-the-scenes bilateral probing met only
Chinese stonewalling. On April 10, 1995, Jakarta went public on
this issue, apparently triggered by China's occupation of
Mischief Reef and ASEAN's strongest statement yet on the South
China Sea 3 weeks later.
Beijing's incremental advances into the Spratlys and beyond
seem to proceed based on the logic that occupation is nine-tenths
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of the law. As one of the world's largest coastal states with a
coastline of approximately 11,000 kilometers and another 10,000
kilometers surrounding its 3,416 islands, China is a major
beneficiary of UNCLOS that accepted and encoded the Latin
American demand for the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (Article
57). That China has yet to ratify the UNCLOS speaks directly to
the politics of unilateral security in the Spratlys.
China's advance into the Spratlys and beyond is primarily an
extension of domestic politics. At the 1991 session of the
National People's Congress (NPC), 31 deputies representing
China's coastal provinces and municipalities signed a motion
calling for the enactment of a "law of the seas" as soon as
possible to protect China's interests and marine resources. China
today regards the disputed but oil-rich Paracel and Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea in terms all too reminiscent of
the Third Reich's lebensraum imperial policy.
The picture that emerges from recent Chinese internal
military writings is that war is still considered preferable to
the appearance of surrendering sovereign claims in the South
China Sea to a group of small Southeast Asian states. Violent
conflict over the resources of the South China Sea is considered
a real possibility in the next 10 years. Against this backdrop,
the NPC adopted on February 25, 1992, "The Law of the People's
Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous
Areas" to empower the PRC to exercise "its sovereignty over its
territorial waters and its rights to exercise control over their
adjacent areas, and to safeguard state security as well as its
maritime rights and interests" (Article 1). Article 2 stipulates
China's territorial sovereignty as including "the mainland and
its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands
including Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, Penghu Islands, Dongsha
Islands, Xisha [Paracel] Islands, Nansha [Spratly] Islands, and
other islands that belong to the PRC" (Article 2).37 The law
vests the Chinese military with the right to remove by force any
incursion on the stipulated islands and areas. President Jiang
Zemin issued a clarion call that the military "should enhance
combat strength in an all-around way; should more successfully
shoulder the lofty mission of defending the country's territorial
sovereignty over the land and in the air, as well as its rights
and interests on the sea; and should safeguard the unification
and security of the motherland."38 As if to add credibility to
this assertion, Beijing announced in May 1992 that it had signed
a contract with a U.S. oil company, Crestone Energy Corporation,
to explore oil in a block contiguous to an offshore Vietnamese
oil field. The president of Crestone has claimed that the
operation will be protected by the Chinese Navy. In June 1992
China landed troops on a reef claimed by Vietnam and set up a
"sovereignty post."
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It is reported that some 400 "Chinese scholars completed 10
years of research on the Spratly Islands in late 1994 to prove
historically that China discovered and developed the Spratly
Islands." A group of former American military leaders who visited
China in late 1994 has also reported that China is mobilizing a
limited military force "capable of rapid response" designed to
protect China's claims in the South China Sea as a matter of
national priority. Admiral Liu Huaqing, the only military member
of the ruling standing committee of the Politburo and former
chief of the PLAN, has been a leading advocate for seizing the
rich mineral and fishing grounds of the South China Sea to
support China's burgeoning population.39
For China, in short, there is little room for compromise,
largely because of the conflation of sovereignty, security,
status, and "lateral pressure." With the energy demands rising
and oil supplies falling, China for the first time became in 1993
a net importer of oil. China is in favor of the peaceful
settlement of disputes, we are told, but opposes the
internationalization of the Spratlys issue. Since the Spratly
Islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times, the
possibility of internationalization does not exist. This
unilateralism conjures up the image of China as a determined
irredentist power that has resorted to the use of force outside
its existing borders in more conflicts and more often than any
other East Asian state. China stands out as one of the 10 most
"crisis active states" in the international system during the 50year period 1929-79, with all but one of its foreign policy
crises deriving from the core issue of national security and
occurring along the peripheries of what it regards as "sacred
home territory," whether so recognized or not by others. In
contrast with the Guomindang period of 1929-49, the overwhelming
choice of conflict-coping and crisis-managing techniques during
the post-1949 PRC era was violence.40
The broader point is that China has yet to resort to
military force purely on behalf of the communist revolutionary
cause, nor has China used its military power recklessly in a
manner befitting naked aggression. In expounding "principled
stand," Chinese scholars and publicists repeatedly and
categorically state that China will never occupy an inch of
foreign territory, nor will it yield an inch of Chinese
territory. The problem obviously lies in the expansive definition
of Chinese territory. In domestic politics no Chinese leader can
afford to appear soft on such highly-charged nationalistic
issues. Southward gunboat diplomacy may have also been spurred by
the belief that other claimants as well as the global community,
on the basis of past behavior, are unlikely to react strongly
against Chinese coercive diplomacy. Equally significant is the
fact that the post-Cold War strategic environment in this
contested area presents a timely challenge and opportunity for
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the Chinese military to demonstrate its blue-water naval power
and for the Chinese government to project national identity as
the unstoppable up-and-coming superpower in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Nonetheless, China's gunboat diplomacy has injected new life
into ASEAN as a regional organization, just when the U.N.brokered peace settlement in Cambodia seemed to have removed
Vietnam as a common thread that held the six member states
together. The 1992 Manila Declaration was obviously addressed to
China as a rallying point for ASEAN to have its regional security
act together in this unsettling post-Cold War transitional
setting. Faced with the rising chorus of the "China threat
theory" (Zhongguo weixian lun)--Beijing gave birth to this theory
in 1992--and the initiative for East Asian multilateral security
dialogue in the ASEAN countries, China began in 1992 to soften,
slightly and ambiguously, its unilateral security line. While
dismissing a unified multilateral security mechanism such as the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as
completely inappropriate to the diversity of the Asia-Pacific
region, China suggested "to establish gradually a bilateral,
subregional, and regional multichannel and multilayered security
dialogue mechanism so as to hold consultations on the issues
concerned and to strengthen interchange and confidence."41 At the
July 1994 meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), however,
China successfully threw its weight to keep the Spratly issue off
the agenda.
China's strike against the Philippines in 1995 has already
given another shot in the arm of the ARF, bringing China into
direct confrontation not only with a communist neighbor but also,
more importantly, a noncommunist member of ASEAN. China's
"divide-and-conquer" strategy seemed to have received a serious
blow when ASEAN issued a joint statement on March 18, 1995,
calling for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. At the firstever Sino-ASEAN bilateral meeting in April 1995, held in the
Chinese provincial city of Hangzhou, China softened its stand,
giving its assurances about its peaceful intentions and
retreating from its claim to the Natuna Islands. From mid-1995
on, Beijing pursued a Jekyll-and-Hyde diplomacy with Chinese
diplomats abroad, giving assurances that China is now willing to
discuss with parties concerned over the Spratlys dispute "in line
with established principles and international law and modern
maritime law, including the basic principles and rules enshrined
in the UNCLOS,"42 even as the PLAN continues to occupy Mischief
Reef and shows no signs of dismantling its military structures in
the area. Taking advantage of global attention turned to the
crisis in the Taiwan Strait in early 1996, Beijing has quietly
set up more "scientific expedition posts" in the disputed Spratly
Islands.
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All the same, Chinese strategists began to give more
expansive definitions and claims of China's continental shelf
with a warning: "Greater indoctrination in an ocean concept to
increase awareness of the oceans, to inculcate a strong concept
of the oceans as national territory, and of cherishing every inch
of China's ocean territory is a matter of major importance having
a bearing on the survival and development of China's
posterity."43 With Vietnam's entry into ASEAN in July 1995, the
quiet days of ARF's low-key approach to East Asian security may
well be numbered. An increasingly assertive unilateral China now
encounters the flowering of a much-dreaded balance of coalitionbuilding, not only at the multilateral ARF level but also at the
bilateral level (i.e., the 1995 Indonesia-Australia defense
accord and the 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration).
China's response to the rise of a nascent ARF-based regional
cooperative security mechanisms seemed Janus-faced. On the one
hand, China's post-Cold War strategy of guaranteeing national
security is said to be a "three-in-one strategy" of strengthening
the modernization of national defense, supporting regional
cooperation in guaranteeing security to reduce the hidden danger
of military conflicts, and developing good-neighborly relations
to increase mutual trust.44 And yet, China's post-Cold War
security strategy, as revealed in an internal document on January
28, 1995, indicates otherwise. According to the document, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and military have agreed to oppose
any idea of establishing an Asian collective security scheme, as
proposed by Japan and other countries. Such a regional collective
security system would increase the possibility that southeast
Asian nations may rehash their arguments over the Chinese threat
theory, especially over the Spratly Islands dispute and thus
impinge too closely on Beijing's expansive regional security zone
for comfort.45
Global Security Behavior.
To a significant extent, the post-Cold War challenge of
preventing, controlling, restraining, weakening, or encapsulating
regional armed conflicts has devolved on the Security Council.
Having extricated itself from the paralysis of East-West
confrontation, the Security Council has decided not to let state
sovereignty get in its way of intervening in certain situations
perceived to be threatening international peace or collective
moral consciousness of the world community. Against this backdrop
and at the request of the first-ever Security Council Summit in
late January 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros-Ghali issued
6 months later a landmark report entitled "An Agenda for Peace,"
calling upon the Member States, in particular upon the Perm Five,
to redefine state sovereignty to strengthen the world
organization's capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking,
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peace-keeping, and post-conflict peace- building. While paying
the mandatory lip service to the principle of state sovereignty,
the Secretary-General made it clear what is required for the
world organization to meet the rising demands of people's
security: "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty,
however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality."46
Of the Perm Five, China has jumped the gun by projecting the
most skeptical posture toward Secretary- General Boutros BoutrosGhali's Agenda for Peace.47 Apparently, the Secretary-General's
report contained too many sovereignty-diluting features, thus
provoking Beijing's public opposition: "U.N. reform should
contribute to maintaining the sovereignty of its member states.
Sovereign states are the subjects of international law and the
foundation for the formation of the United Nations. The
maintenance of state sovereignty serves as the basis for the
establishment of a new international order."48 More specifically,
China argued that all the activities of the United Nations,
whether in preventive diplomacy or peacemaking, whether in
peacekeeping or post-conflict peace-building, should strictly
observe the principles of state sovereignty and of noninterference in the internal affairs of Member States.49
In practice, China's position on U.N. peacekeeping has
shifted over the years, although within the parameters of state
sovereignty, evolving through three distinct periods: (1)
opposition/nonparticipation (1971-81); (2) support/ participation
(1982-89); and (3) retreat/participation (1990-present). The Gulf
crisis marks the beginning of the retreat/participation period.
Despite the publicly expressed support for U.N. peacekeeping
between 1982 and 1989, the first litmus test showed that the
maxi/mini strategy disguised in the legitimizing principle of
state sovereignty remains the bottom line of China's
indeterminate strategy in the Security Council. In the face of
both America's military victory under the banner of Security
Council Resolution 678 and the growing number of U.N. peacemaking
and state-making activities in 1991-92, China retreated by
redefining its stand in a contingent manner. Suddenly, it is now
argued that peacekeeping operations can only be established and
conducted in compliance with the principle of non-interference in
internal affairs as the U.N. Charter does not authorize
involvement in the internal disputes of its member states.50
Tellingly, China has exerted considerable influence not by
hyperactive positive engagement but by following an indeterminate
reactive strategy vacillating between tacit cooperation and
aloofness. Except on the issues of Taiwan's U.N. bid (national
identity), North Korea (sanctions and strategic interest), and
Rwanda (genocide), the Chinese have been passive and reactive to
a fault waiting to see what positions other states take before
staking out its own position, usually in the end game of a
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negotiating process. For post-Tiananmen China, afflicted with the
twin legitimation crises at home and abroad, international
sanctions, especially U.S.-sponsored sanctions against North
Korea, triggers the sound and fury response of state sovereignty.
There is another logic driving Chinese behavior on the North
Korean issue in the Security Council. As one Security Council
representative put it,
And they [PRC representatives] used the North Korean
debate as a case to illustrate a deeper point--If you
can't force the North Koreans to do what you want, how
do you imagine you could ever force the Chinese to do
anything? Nothing can be done against the Chinese . . .
We lobbied them as part of the NAM (Non-Aligned
Movement) countries on the Bosnia and the Haiti
missions. Again, they believe in bilateral dealing,
they come, they smile, they leave.51
China's voting behavior in the Security Council is closely
keyed to and conditioned by its maxi-mini diplomacy. Despite its
"principled opposition" to a wide range of issues in the Security
Council, China has consistently expressed its opposition in the
form of "nonparticipation in the vote" in the early post-entry
years and abstention in recent years. From 1990 to 1994, China
abstained 22 times, voted affirmatively with reservations 10
times, and voted affirmatively on the remainder of Security
Council resolutions (of which some were passed under Chapter
VII), without exercising its veto even once. Of the 22
resolutions in which China abstained, 13 were explicitly Chapter
VII enforcement measures. Thus, China is sometimes forced to
affirm a resolution (as in the case of resolution 827 on
international war crimes tribunal in Bosnia) which violates its
most cherished principle of the nonviolability of state
sovereignty with nothing more than the habit-driven pronouncement
of "principled position."52 The most obvious explanation for such
behavior is the desire to retain its maximum leverage believed to
be inherent in its indeterminate strategy of becoming all things
to all nations on all serious threats to international peace and
security. To abstain is to apply the Chinese code of conduct of
being firm in principle but flexible in application or to find a
face-saving exit with voice in cases where they pose conflicting
Realpolitik geopolitical interests and Idealpolitik normative
concerns for international reputation. In short, the pattern that
emerges with respect to China's voting behavior in the Council,
particularly abstentions on Chapter VII enforcement resolutions,
is neither positive engagement nor destructive obstruction, but
one of pursuing the maxi-mini strategy in a situation-specific
and self-serving way.
Despite the habitual claim that support for and solidity
with the Third World is a basic principle in Chinese foreign
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policy, China has emerged as the most independent self-centered
actor in global group politics, a veritable Group of 1 (G-1).
Even in such a multilateral setting, China makes its preference
for bilateralism over multilateralism loud and clear. While
giving rhetorical support to the idea of a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula (who doesn't?), Beijing has repeatedly denied any role
or responsibility as the Korean nuclear issue is said to be
directly and exclusively a dispute between the DPRK on the one
hand, and the United States, IAEA, and ROK on the other. At the
same time, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made it clear on many
occasions that his government is not only opposed to economic
sanctions, but also against bringing up the issue at all in the
IAEA and the Security Council. What intensifies Beijing's
security concern and its opposition to the unification-byabsorption scenario is the perception of U.S. strategy on the
Korean nuclear issue. "To put it bluntly," as one pro-PRC
newspaper in Hong Kong writes, "the United States wants to use
this chance to topple the DPRK, and this is a component of U.S.
strategy to carry out peaceful evolution in the socialist
countries." And the United States "will practice a strategy of
destruction against North Korea--the last Stalinist regime in the
world--with the aim of enabling South Korea to gobble up North
Korea, like West Germany gobbling up East Germany." Such U.S.
strategy poses not only an ideological challenge but, more
significantly, a strategic threat as "China regards the Korean
region as an important buffer zone between China and the United
States."53
The nature of the Chinese position on the question of U.N.
institutional reform, especially on the expansion of Security
Council membership, has remained cautious, noncommital, and
reactive. The logic of defensive mechanisms is obvious. Beijing
has a vested symbolic and real interest in keeping the Security
Council exactly as it is. Not only would an increase in the
number of permanent membership dilute its own influence, but any
changes in the use of veto power would also reduce its leverage.
China often gets what it wants through the threat to use its veto
power. Any successful expansion of permanent membership would
inevitably emasculate its status and leverage as the only nonWestern, Third World country in the cockpit of U.N. politics. One
Chinese international relations scholar goes as far as echoing
the Soviet party line in the 1970s--since the veto is the
keystone of the existence of the United Nations, it should not be
tampered with or even restricted in its usage.54
With the demise of the strategic triangle and the growing
marginalization of the China factor in the normative domain of
global politics, China's permanent membership in the Security
Council remains the only diplomatic way it can portray itself as
a global power. As well, the veto power serves as a fungible
instrument of renewable influence and leverage in the service of
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China-specific interests. Like nuclear weapons, the real power of
the veto lies not so much in its actual use as in the threat to
use or not to use. Paradoxically, the Taiwan factor in Beijing's
quest for absolute legitimation expands the limits of the
possible and permissible in widening China's own official
diplomatic network. The unusually swift recognition of 12 newly
minted independent states in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union in December 1991 was prompted by fear that Taiwan
would jump the gun. The single greatest leverage Beijing had in
this connection was its veto power in the Security Council and
the threat to use it in blocking the entry of any of these newly
formed states into the world organization--no prior acceptance of
the Beijing formula for its absolute legitimation, no U.N.
entry.55
There is also a sense in which such a pro forma
establishment of diplomatic networking is to make a virtue of
necessity, bespeaking a deep anxiety about the viability of one
sovereign, unified, multinational Chinese state amid turbulent
global politics and growing ethnonational conflicts in many
trouble spots of the world. With the recent revival of Taiwan's
U.N. bid, Beijing's veto power has been publicly touted as the
powerful sword and impregnable shield that defend the integrity
of People's China as the only legitimate Chinese government in
the United Nations. It seems that the United Nations in general,
and the Security Council in particular, have suddenly become
important in direct proportion to the diminution of Beijing's
internal security and external reputation. Thanks to Beijing's
solo obstructive behavior in the Haitian case in the Security
Council in late February 1996, the image of the self-styled
champion for the Third World got burned beyond easy repair. As
one participant put it, "It was conduct unbecoming a permanent
council member and was especially galling because China portrays
itself as the champion of the downtrodden and a leader of
developing nations, which it stiffed throughout."63
China's security behavior in the highly sensitive domain of
arms control and disarmament (ACD) is fraught with 56biguities
and contradictions inherent in its balancing act between
Realpolitik interests and idealpolitik concerns.57 In 25 years of
U.N. participation, Beijing's public position has progressively
shifted from initial dismissive non- participation (the 1970s),
to reluctant selective participation (the 1980s), to
comprehensive entrapped participation (the 1990s) in various ACD
regimes, especially in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in
Geneva. As if to demonstrate that there is more than meets the
suspicious eye in such posturing, however, China in 1982-92 has
acceded to 10 of the 12 multilateral ACD conventions.58 During
the first half of the 1990s, China officially acceded to the NPT
(March 1992), finally signaled in September 1993 its willingness
to directly participate in negotiations for a Comprehensive Test
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Ban Treaty (CTBT), indicated a willingness to conclude the treaty
by the end of 1996, and accepted strict parameters of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) regarding sale of missiles
through a bilateral agreement with the United States in October
1994.
Still, the unstated code of conduct guiding China's
consecutive and simultaneous participation in multiple security
games on multiple chessboards is a maxi/mini axiom--the
maximization of security benefits via free-riding and/or
defection strategies and the minimization of normative (image)
costs. Since its entry into global ACD regimes and negotiations
in the early 1980s, China translated its self-help realpolitik
into the espousal of differentiated rights and responsibilities
in the global ACD processes, assiduously avoiding commitments
that would place constraints on its own nuclear weapons development.59 Since the two superpowers account for the bulk of nuclear
weapons, it is they who must bear the primary responsibility by
drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals before other nuclear
weapons states can join the disarmament process. The Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) and START-II that will reduce
each nuclear superpower's strategic arsenal by about threefourths (to fewer than 3,5000 warheads) seem to have no
discernable impact on China's ACD behavior. While acknowledging
and characterizing these treaties as "some initial progress,"
China insists that such progress is still preliminary and
limited, and that the two nuclear superpowers still have a long
way go in the process of nuclear disarmament. Pending the
realization of
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons, however, all nuclear-weapon states
should undertake the following commitments: 1) not to
be the first to use nuclear weapons and conclude an
international agreement on the no-first-use principle;
2) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear weaponfree zones and conclude an international agreement in
this regard; and 3) to support the proposals for the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and
undertake the corresponding obligations.60
In this way, China projects its role as a constructive and
positive player in the U.N. disarmament game without constraining
its own nuclear development. Not surprisingly, the Third World's
long-standing demand to halve all nuclear tests fell on China's
deaf ears until 1993. Since a comprehensive nuclear test ban and
nuclear disarmament are linked, the United States and Russia
"have the obligation to take the lead in halting all nuclear
tests and carrying out drastic nuclear disarmament so as to
create conditions for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests."61
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In light of such free-riding/defection strategy, Beijing's
declaration of its willingness to participate in CTBT
negotiations in the fall of 1993 constitutes, potentially, a
significant shift from unilateral security to security
interdependence and an important constraint on the further
development and testing of its nuclear weapons program. Yet, once
inside the CTBT negotiation processes, China has been behaving in
a realist self-help fashion, trying hard to slow, divert, and
delay the completion of the CTBT that would constrain its nuclear
testing program. China, in the home stretch of a negotiating
process, has injected several preconditions for successful
completion of the treaty that are not acceptable to other
participants in the CTBT negotiations, i.e., (1) the right of
declared nuclear weapons states to conduct peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs), (2) no first use pledge (NFU), and (3)
negative security com- mitments (NSC) by the nuclear weapons
states. The official position is that China will put an end to
its nuclear tests once the consensually-arrived treaty enters
into effect. Having thus committed to halting its nuclear tests
after the treaty comes into effect, China has proposed a lengthy
ratification procedure leading to entry into effect of the CTBT
following its signing, arousing suspicions among many states that
Beijing is determined to delay CTBT negotiations as long as
possible and with as many preconditions and delaying tactics as
possible, so as to allow its military to complete as many
underground nuclear tests as possible for the accelerated
modernization of its nuclear warheads. Indeed, on March 29, 1996,
hopes of the 38-member CD to wrap up 2-year CTBT negotiations by
June 1996 and send a consensus treaty to the U.N. General
Assembly by September 1996 more or less collapsed. The CD
adjourned for a recess of more than 6 weeks due largely to
China's PNEs demand at odds with the other four declared nuclear
weapons states, even as Chinese disarmament ambassador Sha Zukang
publicly declared that "no country can impose its will on China
under any circumstances."62 Faced with President Yeltsin's
jawboning to sign the CTBT, China came up with a new escape
clause--"mankind needs to keep developing ‘peaceful' nuclear
weapons in case a giant asteroid is discovered careering through
space on a collision course with the earth."63
The pattern of Chinese ACD behavior in the implementation
process is one of "who me?" denial, double-talk, and
responsibility shifting. In selling proscribed weapons of mass
destruction to rogue regimes, Beijing takes extraordinary
precautions to elude international detection. Only in the face of
irrefutable evidence directly linking Beijing to Third World
customers, has it confirmed missile or nuclear technology sales.
Once such evidence is uncovered, Beijing either cites its
nonproliferation pledges since 1984 or, more recently, its
accession to the NPT regime as prima facie evidence of its full
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compliance with the regime norms, or insists that what have been
sold are for peaceful uses only. China then seeks to shift
responsibility for ensuring the peaceful uses of its nuclear
technology to its customers and the IAEA. All the same, China
often makes a broad liberal construction of the regime rules and
norms that its NPT commitment cannot take effect retroactively
and/or that the specifications of the missiles which it has sold
fall outside the scope of the regime norms. China even insists on
the redefining the Middle East for purposes of arms sales
limitations so as to exclude its own major customers (Algeria and
Libya) but to include Turkey (a major U.S. customer).64
With the collapse of the strategic triangle, the temptation
to use, by way of substitution, whatever other instrumentalities
Beijing possessed became well-nigh irresistible. It was in this
context of the post-Cold War and post-communist world politics
that the Chinese leadership found the arms sales, especially in
the nuclear and missile field, as another way of demonstrating
its status as a global power, and that festering regional
conflicts in the Third World, especially in the Middle East,
could not be resolved without China's participation and tacit
cooperation. The conventional view that Chinese arms sales
patterns and directions follow the logic of market demand factor-and that economic power in post-Mao China grows out of cash
sales on the arms barrelhead--is not so much wrong as it is
incomplete. China's missile sales to Saudi Arabia--Dong Feng 3
(CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles-- earned not only
hard currency but also a much-sought diplomatic switch from
Taipei to Beijing (on July 21, 1990). Despite its refusal to
recognize Israel until the Palestinian question is solved,
Beijing has maintained covert military ties with that country
since 1980 and finally recognized and established official
diplomatic relations in early 1992. It is widely believed that
Israel has emerged in the post-Tiananmen years as China's
leading foreign supplier of advanced technology, becoming in
effect China's "back door" to U.S. technology.65
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis of China's quest for security in the
post-Cold War world leads to one obvious and somewhat paradoxical
conclusion. Despite the ritualistic and habit-driven assault on
"power politics," Beijing has emerged as perhaps the most
unabashed practitioner of power politics in the post-Cold War
setting. Beijing's own security thinking and behavior seemed
firmly embedded in the realpolitik track, allowing only
hypernationalist calculus to play a dominant role, with a smaller
role for international security interdependence and no role for
common security.66 Despite the participation in the Security
Council and global ACD fora for more than two decades, there is
little evidence of any fundamental paradigm shift from unilateral
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to cooperative security. The notion of security interdependence
in an increasingly interactive and interdependent world that one
state's security is increased, not reduced, only when other
neighboring states also feel secure, or that China's own
unilateral self-help behavior could not easily escape from the
reactive--and self-fulfilling--dynamics, remains yet to find its
way clear to China's security thinking and behavior in the postCold War world.
This is not to deny the rise of an ACD policy community at
home and the dramatic increase in China's participation in and
commitment to multilateral ACD conventions including the NPT. But
all the policy shifts in the 1980s and 1990s can be better seen
as adaptive realpolitik rather than a fundamental change in the
strategic paradigm or worldview. China has exploited, and will
probably continue to exploit, its participation in international
ACD regimes and negotiations as a more cost-effective way of
learning how to defect or free-ride within, rather than without,
these regimes. In attempting to reconcile the seemingly
irreconcilable--unilateral realpolitik security interests versus
idealpolitik concerns for its international reputation--Beijing
latches itself onto the declarations of its antihegemonism and
no-first-use pledge as both necessary and sufficient conditions
for peace and stability in the region, indeed as the surest and
shortest pathway to global peace. In this way China projects its
"principled stand" on a range of ACD issues, asking others to
follow what China says, not what China actually does.
The driving force for such realpolitik behavior is not any
sense of a military threat from any external power but the
leadership's resolve to project its national identity as an upand-coming superpower in the Asia-Pacific region, so as to make
up for the growing domestic legitimation and security deficits.
The dogged determination to enact and legitimize national
identity in terms of state sovereignty, state status, and state
security defines the parameters of China's quest for security in
the post-Cold War setting, conditioning Beijing's response to
regional and global cooperative security mechanisms and
processes. The mounting international outcry against China's
perfidious behavior on human rights abuses at home, nuclear
weapons or missile proliferation, maritime expansionism in the
South China Sea, and missile diplomacy against Taiwan is
increasingly viewed as a Western conspiracy led by Washington to
carry out a "peaceful evolution" (heping yanbian) or "divide-andconquer" strategy of winning war without firing a single shot and
thus arresting China's accelerated march to the promised land of
superpowerdom.
Paradoxically, post-Tiananmen China is at one and the same
time a growing regional military power--and a major non-status
quo power--with extensive irredentist claims to territories and
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islands along and beyond its periphery throughout the AsiaPacific region as well as an insecure and weak status quo state
at home. Contrary to the popular notion, the PRC today is a weak
state pretending and trying desperately to be a strong state. The
defining and differentiating feature of a weak state is the lack
of a unifying national ethic or legitimizing ideology and the
correspondingly high level of violence or power to cope with
domestically generated threats to the security of the
government.67 Faced with such a legitimacy-cum-identity crisis,
the CCP leadership has shifted toward perform-ance-based
legitimation to enhance system effectiveness via "market
Leninism" and flexing its military muscle power "near abroad"
(the Spratlys and Taiwan). That is, the post-Tiananmen leadership
is seizing geo-economic and geo-strategic opportunities abroad
(the global marketplace and the power vacuum in the post-Cold War
Asia-Pacific region) to cope with legitimation and identity
threats at home (fragmentation). When the PRC's official national
identity and legitimation are blocked in one domain, as earlier
postulated, the leadership seeks to compensate in another. Hypermilitarism, hyper-nationalism, and mercantile diplomacy are
synergistically linked to form a tripod of security policy in the
post-Cold War era, buying performance-based legitimation. In
short, as China becomes more insecure and fragmented at home, it
feels more compelled to demonstrate its toughness abroad.
The legitimation-cum-identity crisis has been accentuated as
well by a deep anxiety about other competing processes of
national identity mobilization among Muslims in Xinjiang, Mongols
in inner Mongolia, Tibetans in Tibet, Chinese in Hong Kong, and
island-born Taiwanese in Taiwan. What makes the sound and fury of
state sovereignty all the more compelling, yet problematic in the
Chinese case, is the unresolved unification problem coupled with
the twin challenges of globalization from above and without and
substate ethnonational fragmentation from below and within.
Lacking charismatic and rational-legal legitimacy, the postTiananmen third-generation leadership instinctively invokes the
party-state's last remaining source of--and indeed its ultimate
claim to--legitimacy grounded in the national-identity enacting
mission of restoring China's great-power status in the world.
Chinese hypernationalism disguised as state sovereignty has
become a sword with which to cope with a host of domestic threats
and a shield with which to ward off any external normative
challenge. Thus, the Chinese leadership seemed unable and
unwilling to manage the rising tension between nationalism and
internationalism or to make the necessary compromises on issues
of sovereignty relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang,
Spratlys, Senkakus, and the remaining irredentist claims to
territory held by many of China's 16 neighboring countries.
Yet fighting ethnonatinalist separatist fire with Han
hypernationalist fire can easily backfire. China's basic security
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dilemma here is not only ethnonationally charged but geostrategically entangled, as more than 80 million minority
nationality people (or about 8 percent of the total population),
reside in the strategically sensitive but politically
"autonomous" regions that account for roughly 64 percent of
Chinese territory. The image of sovereign Kazahks, Kyrgyz,
Uzbeks, Taijiks, and Mongols in the post-Cold War setting of
substate fragmentation and rising ethnonationalism could prove
too inspiring for the non-Han peoples in Xinjiang, Inner
Mongolia, and Tibet to put up with their suppressed national
identities.
Clearly, China encounters here a "too little, too much"
dilemma in its domestic/foreign policy. The latest round of
coercive missile diplomacy against Taiwan may well have been
catalyzed by the belief in a domino theory with Chinese
characteristics--if Taiwan goes its separate way, what next?
Today's Russia may not necessarily be tomorrow's China, but the
challenge of transforming multiple "Chinas"-- Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Macao, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and more--into one
unified, coherent and stable multinational state, with two or
more systems, without much bloodletting or federalism seems like
a mission nearly impossible.
There is little doubt that the rise of the China chorus made
possible by China's remarkable economic growth and assertive
nationalism has bought some political legitimacy for the Chinese
leadership. And yet, paradoxically, the rise of China thesis
comes at a time of a rapid deterioration of the coherence of the
Chinese state. State sovereignty no longer provides the center
with security or control, as domestic, social, political,
demographic, and environmental problems in Beijing's march to the
promised land of superpowerdom are becoming legion. How can the
wobbly edifice of the Chinese national security state survive the
multiplying threats from within? Despite the unpre- cedented
economic growth and an all-time global record in doubling per
capita output in the shortest time period in the history of the
global political economy (1977-87),68 hundreds of thousands of
Chinese are escaping from their homeland in search of better
economic opportunities and political freedom in foreign
countries--a very obvious stye in China's national identity
projection. Irrespective of the amount of violence power at its
command, such a repressive state is ipso facto a weak state. No
state, certainly not a huge multinational state, can be held
together for too long without a legitimizing democratic system,
as dramatically shown by the collapse of what was widely and
wrongly perceived to be a strong state in the former Soviet
Union.
Can a weak, insecure, and fragmenting state be expected to
be or act as a responsible and peace-loving great power? Only
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time will tell whether my reading of China's security behavior as
more domestically driven and as more conflict prone is correct.
As it is, the once widely shared image of a China in
disintegration and of a dragon rampant in neighboring Asian
states seems to be moving perilously close to the reality.
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